SCARED STRAIGHT: AN ARGUMENT FOR A NEW CAUSE
OF ACTION TO ENFORCE MUTUAL FUND
DIRECTOR INDEPENDENCE
STEVEN D. TIBBETS1
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent months, the focus of governmental reform in the wake of the
post-dot-com-bubble wave of corporate scandal has been fixed on the financial
services industry.2 Regulatory and enforcement activism at both the federal and state
levels has shed an unprecedented amount of light on an entire industry, the
management of which seems, in hindsight, to have long operated in the shadows, or
at least off the radar screen, of most legislators and the investing public. While
recent Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) rulemaking and activism by
state attorney generals have sought to produce some improvements in the
management of investment companies and their usefulness to investors, these
measures have received substantial criticism, ranging from claims that regulatory
changes are useless to claims that politicians are ruining perfectly good investment
companies for their own political gain.3 The following article proposes an altogether
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unique change in the law that should more effectively target the specific abuses that
seem to plague the investment company industry, particularly mutual funds.
Among those who observe the mutual fund industry, there appears to be
agreement that directors of mutual funds are too beholden to the advisors and
managers of the funds to direct effectively. Directors sit on the boards of too many
mutual funds, do not possess enough financial sophistication to competently serve as
directors, and are too dependent on director salaries to effectively oversee their
funds. Some commentators go so far as to argue that had mutual fund directors
more diligently overseen their companies’ investments, they could have prevented
the recent financial crises that have plagued the United States.4
In an interesting coincidence, some mutual fund shareholders have sued the
directors of their funds in recent years, alleging breaches of fiduciary duties imposed
by the Investment Company Act of 1940 (hereinafter, “Investment Company Act”
or “Act”), seeking relief from the lack of independence that commentators have
identified.5 However, these plaintiffs have found little or no success. In order to
ensure director independence, as encouraged by several commentators, Congress
should legislatively create a new cause of action that empowers mutual fund
shareholders with a private enforcement action.
Directors of mutual fund companies have somewhat different duties than
their counterparts in traditional corporations due to the unique structure of mutual
funds. Mutual funds typically do not have any employees of their own.6 Basically,
advisory companies run most mutual funds as independent contractors of the funds.7
Often the advisor or manager of a mutual fund is the individual or entity that created
the fund and remains closely identified with it despite the fact the advisor or manager
is, in theory, in an arm’s-length relationship with the fund.8 Director independence
maintains the arm’s-length nature of the relationship between a fund and its advisor.
4 See generally Mutual Fund Regulation in the Next Millennium Symposium Panel, 44 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 431
(2001) [hereinafter, the “Symposium Panel”].
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Congress should promulgate a more useful statutory standard of
independence and ensure its maintenance by expanding the private enforcement
incentives that exist under the Act. Following this introductory Part I of this article,
Part II introduces a novel cause of action that allows mutual fund shareholders to
privately enforce director independence. Part III of this article considers the
benefits, costs, and alternative methods of improving independence. Finally, Part IV
concludes by summarizing and consolidating these determinations.
II. A NEW “INDEPENDENCE” CAUSE OF ACTION
Congress, when it established mutual fund shareholders’ right of action
against their directors under the original Act, intended to empower shareholders with
a cause of action through which they could remedy the perceived lack of
arm’s-length bargaining between mutual fund directors and advisors. However, as
the observations of commentators indicate, a sufficient amount of director
independence simply does not exist.9 Therefore, Congress should amend (or more
accurately, expand) the shareholder right of action available under the Act, which is
currently limited to suits for a breach of fiduciary duty involving excessive fees, and
allow shareholders recourse in the courts when they perceive that their directors are
not acting independently.
“Director independence,” for purposes of this article, means that a director is
free to act in a manner that benefits shareholders without regard for whether such
action adversely affects a fund’s advisor or other affiliated persons or directors.10 In
creating a new cause of action, Congress should add the following language to the
Act:
An action may be brought under this Act by the Commission or a
security holder of the registered company against any director of the
registered company for an act or omission, the overall consideration
of which indicates that directors have acted unfairly to shareholders
Symposium Panel, supra note 4, at 432; See generally Statement of John C. Bogle Before the U.S. House of
Representatives Sub-Committee on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the
Committee on Financial Services; Hearing: Mutual Fund Industry Practices and their Effect on Individual Investors
(Mar. 12, 2003) available at http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/031203jb.pdf (last visited
May 12, 2004); BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY, INC., 2002 ANNUAL REPORT 17 (2002) available at
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/2002ar/2002ar.pdf (last visited May 12, 2004).
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by affording the interests of himself or herself or an affiliated person
a greater priority than the interests of shareholders.
This articulation accomplishes two tasks. First, it adopts a meaningful notion of
independence (which Part II(A) below explains in greater detail). Second, it
incorporates the “intermediate” standard of review involved in state law corporate
director’s breach of the duty of care claims. The remainder of this part explains the
formulation of the new cause of action.
For additional clarity of this new cause of action, judges and scholars should
retrospectively scrutinize the conduct of mutual fund directors. Additionally, in
order to avoid “reinventing the wheel,” we should incorporate the common law of
Delaware governing director breaches of fiduciary duty as a compass to guide
construction of this new cause. Delaware’s substantial judicial precedent associated
with the judicial review of directors’ activities would prove extremely helpful in
defining the parameters of the new cause of action.11 Furthermore, a large body of
scholarly thought and years of judge-made law has been devoted to creating the
optimal standard of review regime to govern directorial breaches of fiduciary duty.12
Delaware law divides the fiduciary duties of corporate directors into two
broad categories: the duty of loyalty and the duty of care.13 If a shareholder alleges
that a director engaged in some type of self-dealing at the shareholders’ expense,
courts would apply a duty of loyalty analysis.14 The standard of review that governs a
duty of loyalty claim is one of “entire fairness,” which means that the court broadly
considers all aspects of the allegedly self-dealing transaction to determine if the
director breached his duty of loyalty.15 This standard of review establishes a
William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Function Over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of
Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 1287, 1288-90 (2001). Throughout this discussion,
the author relies primarily on this article for support regarding the standards of review governing
director breaches of fiduciary duty rather than attempting to recreate the work of this article by
reviewing the myriad of Delaware cases it discusses. This article is even better authority than case law
because it represents the work of three eminent Delaware judges and corporate law scholars as they
offer an ideal standard of review regime and point out the flaws in the existing law.
11
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presumption that a self-dealing transaction is a breach of the duty of loyalty, and a
defendant must overcome this presumption to prevail.16
The second category of fiduciary duty existing in Delaware common law is
the duty of care. Cases in which a plaintiff alleges that directors failed to exercise
appropriate judgment in their governance activities implicate the duty of care.17 The
standard of review in these cases, known as the “Business Judgment Rule,”
establishes the presumption that directors acted in a reasonable, prudent, and
independent manner and constitutes a significant burden that plaintiffs must
overcome.18
An intermediate standard of review exists to govern duty of care cases in
which a plaintiff alleges that directors took actions that were not in the interests of
shareholders in an effort to entrench themselves in their board positions.19 The
intermediate standard of review allows courts to exercise judgment without the
imposition of any presumptions.20 Thus far, courts have limited this intermediate
standard to cases involving corporate takeovers.21
The policy tension underlying these varying standards of review is simple.
On one hand, the law seeks to protect shareholders’ ownership rights by arming
them with a cause of action when their representatives, the directors, act unjustly
toward them.22 On the other hand, the law is reluctant to find liability based on a
judge’s non-expert ex post inquiry into directors’ business decisions.23 As the
standards of review indicate, Delaware’s common law applies an adjusted degree of
judicial scrutiny based on the extent that outwardly objective circumstances (e.g., a
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self-dealing transaction by a director) indicate a breach of fiduciary duty.24 The
challenge this article faces is to determine which level of review, if any, is most useful
as a tool for governing the various policy considerations underlying a cause of action
that enforces mutual fund director independence.
The conflict between the shareholders’ ability to exercise ownership power
and judicial second-guessing of business decisions also exists in the mutual fund
context. The specific problem of independence appears most like director
entrenchment, subject to intermediate review.
The following paradigm provides an example. Mutual fund directors decide
not to remove an underperforming fund’s advisor. Assume further that some
evidence of a lack of independence exists (e.g., the director relies on his directorship
for more than half of his income, he is a long-time friend of the advisor, and he was
elected a director at the advisor’s urging). This situation does not offer an obvious
self-dealing transaction in that a self-dealing transaction involves a very specific and
concrete conflict of interest. On the other hand, if we presume that the director in
this example exercised “independent” judgment when he refused to remove the
advisor, then the business judgment rule analysis would substantially deprive a
mutual fund shareholder of his ownership rights by making it essentially impossible
for him to seek redress from this directorial decision. However, to be fair to the
director, the plaintiff should bear some burden of proving that there was reason to
believe that the director should have removed the advisor. In other words, it does
not seem appropriate that the mere allegation that a fund director is not independent
should be sufficient for a shareholder to prevail. The cause of action must demand
some proof, such as underperformance, that the director should have removed the
advisor. Therefore, the intermediate standard of review, free from any presumptions
that restrict the court’s inquiry, is appropriate to govern a new cause of action to
enforce independence.
Furthermore, consider the nature of the inquiry. The new cause of action
invites a fact-finder to question whether, under the circumstances surrounding a
mutual fund director’s decision making, the director would have felt free to act
independently. Although this inquiry involves some analysis of a business decision,
it primarily demands that the fact-finder engage in a “reasonable person” analysis

24
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found throughout the law;25 the fact-finder asks, “would an average person with the
same compensation structure, friend and family relationships, etc., as the director
being sued have felt independent?” The proposed cause of action invites judges and
juries to contemplate matters that involve more of a layman’s analysis as opposed to
a technical business application of reasonableness. Thus, the proposed cause of
action will be useful because it directly targets what commentators agree is a serious
problem, director independence. Further, this analysis fits within a fact-finding
structure, the intermediate review of the Business Judgment Rule, that is well within
the grasp of judges and juries.
III. DEFENDING THE NEW CAUSE
A. The Notion of Independence that the New Cause Embraces
The proposed cause of action adopts a more meaningful notion of
“independence” than the Act currently contemplates. There are a number of sources
from which one can glean the meanings of this term as used in the mutual fund
director context. First, the Act imposes standards of independence on directors.
Second, the SEC has amplified the Act’s instructions with further proposals to
ensure that directors are independent. Finally, commentators have offered their
understandings of independence, often pointing out the shortcomings of the
directorial status quo. This section sets out these various understandings of
independence, suggests the “best understanding” of independence, and explains the
shortcoming of the current statutory regime.
The Act imposes a number of standards of independence on mutual fund
directors. The Act demands that at least 40 percent of the board members of a
mutual fund not be “interested persons” or, to put it another way, must be
independent directors.26 Most mutual funds employ a majority of independent
directors.27 An “interested person” is basically one who is an advisor,28 an officer of
an advisory company, or anyone with an immediate familial or business relationship
with the mutual fund, the advisor, or an employee or legal counsel of the advisory
25 For an explanation of the notion of “reasonable person,” see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2
(2001).
26
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company.29 Additionally, directors, and persons who are affiliated with them,30 may
not underwrite or broker any securities that the mutual fund purchases.31 Finally, the
Act also stipulates that a director may not acquire a stake in an underwriter of the
mutual fund.32 Thus, the Act appears most concerned with opportunistic directors
who invest mutual fund monies in enterprises in which they had a stake, rather than
investing to maximize the shareholders’ welfare. The Act’s independence
requirements attempt to limit director incentives for such dealings.
Recently, the SEC implemented a number of measures targeted at improving
the information used by investment products customers in their decision-making.
According to an SEC press release, these measures “are designed to encourage
mutual fund advertisements that convey more balanced information to prospective
investors, particularly with respect to past performance.”33 For example, the new
regulations require that mutual fund advertisements: (1) direct attention to
investment objectives, risks, and charges; (2) make more prominent disclosures of
certain information related to the timing of past performance (to prevent the
exaggeration of brief moments of excellent performance); and (3) reemphasize that
fund advertisements are subject to antifraud provisions of federal securities laws.34
Through these regulations, the SEC is attempting to improve the mutual fund
market by limiting mutual fund advertisement to the underlying economics of a
particular transaction.

15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(19) (1997). This provision actually sets out a much more specific and intricate
definition of “interested person” than the one the text describes. The definition in the text has been
simplified to capture the thrust of the Investment Company Act’s definition of “interested person”
while allowing the text to remain readable.
29

30

See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(3) (1997) (providing the Act’s definition of affiliated persons).

31 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(b)(1) & (2) (1997). There is an exception to both of these requirements,
however, for instances where a majority of the board of directors is composed of people who are not
brokers or underwriters. Id.
32
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33 Stephen E. Roth & Elisabeth M. Grano, The Impact of New Form N-6 and Amendments to Form N-4
on Underlying Mutual Fund Disclosure, in A SEMINAR FOR ’40 ACT LAWYERS 501 (2003); Coffee, supra
note 2.
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These new regulations expand the Act’s definition of “material business or
professional relationship” by preventing any individual deemed to be “interested”
under the Act within the last two years from serving as an independent director.35
Essentially, the Act dictates that independent directors may neither be “interested
persons” nor have been an “interested person” within two years of becoming a
director. The SEC’s interpretation applies this two-year prohibition to the Act’s
requirement that an independent director may not engage in “material transactions”
that would have made him an “interested person” (such as providing services to the
fund’s advisor).36 The SEC’s interpretation goes on to endorse directors’
indemnification insurance if it only indemnifies directors from liability for good faith
efforts in fulfilling their duties.37 Likewise, the SEC’s interpretation endorses
directors’ purchasing of shares of the funds that they direct in order to better align
their interests with those of the shareholders.38 Thus, the SEC extends the Act’s
independence requirements. However, commentators argue that mutual fund
directors lack independence in ways that neither the Act nor the SEC appear to
contemplate.
Several commentators embrace a “real world” understanding of
independence, approaching independence from the perspective of the director,
rather than focusing, as the Act does, on external indicators of impropriety. While
the Act addresses very clear conflicts of interest, commentators take into account
more subtle pressures and incentives that might induce independent directors to use
less than their best judgment. For example, Mark Sargent, Dean of Villanova School
of Law, states that mutual fund directors are “damned if they do … act
independently of the fund managers, and damned if they do not.”39 Sargent
expresses that “there have been notorious situations in which independent directors
who exercised their authority to remove fund managers under the appropriate
circumstances have, as a result, faced proxy battles to remove them from office.”40
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Several commentators argue for regulation of independent directors to eliminate this
dilemma.
Commentators most often cite the process by which mutual funds select
independent directors as creating an inherent conflict of interest. For example, most
independent directors are selected as a favor or reward for being a friend or trusted
colleague of the entrepreneur or company that started the mutual fund.41 This
phenomenon results in boards made up of independent directors who are grateful
for receiving their well-compensated positions and do not wish to make decisions
that may be unpopular with fund managers or fellow directors. Steve Howard, a
partner at the New York law firm of Paul Weiss with considerable experience
counseling mutual funds and their directors, has proposed what he believes is an
ideal approach for maintaining independence.42 Howard argues that a national,
perhaps governmental, overseeing body should appoint directors to mutual funds
from a national pool of qualified directors, with directors rotating to different funds
every few years.43 For a veteran of the mutual fund industry to suggest the severing
of the relationship between a mutual fund’s advisors and managers and its directors
reveals the difficult task of attaining appropriate directorial independence. Howard
indicates that informal relationships between directors and fund advisors are better
suited for truly independent directors, as opposed to the “material business or
professional relationships” that saturate the industry and inhibit truly independent
director behavior.
The second strand of commentators’ “independence” regards the “house
director,” or the director that sits on the boards of numerous funds within a fund
family.44 It is a conventional practice in the industry to use one board of directors to

41 Id. at 435 (stating that “[a] method of selection may be used that is haphazard and not systematic,
and thus not designed to identify truly independent individuals.”). The Act demands that a majority
of existing independent directors elect subsequently-appointed directors, but there is little reason to
think that the pressure not to upset the fund manager and advisor would be any less pervasive in this
decision than in any other.
42
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oversee a number of mutual funds within the same family.45 These directors derive a
modest income from each fund, but often receive considerable total compensation
from the fund family.46 For example, each of the seven independent directors of the
Merrill Lynch Developing Capital Markets Fund received between $6,000 and $8,000
for serving on the board of that fund in 2002.47 However, each of these directors
received total compensation ranging from $234,567 to $293,400 for their service on
the boards of a number of Merrill Lynch funds.48 This is particularly shocking
considering the average compensation for directors of industrial corporations was
$154,016 in 2002.49 This “house director” structure provides an obvious disincentive
for a director to raise concerns with the advisor over any one fund and put his entire
compensation from that fund family at risk.
Proponents of these arrangements argue that such boards provide enormous
economies of scale to shareholders by attracting highly qualified directors at a
relatively low cost to any particular fund.50 In fact, some argue that these boards
actually possess much more leverage to negotiate advisory contracts with terms that
are favorable to shareholders due to the fact that the board controls a great deal of
the advisor’s ability to extract fees from numerous funds.51 However, these
justifications are usually rooted in propaganda efforts of interest groups who lobby
on behalf of fund advisors and directors with an interest in maintaining the status
quo.52
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Transcript of the Conference on the Role of Independent
Investment
Company
Directors,
Feb.
23
&
24,
1999,
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/roundtable/iicdrndt2.htm#enhan (last visited May 12,
2004).
45
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1464 (2002).
46

47 See Prospectus of the Merrill Lynch Developing Capital Markets Fund, Inc., Oct. 10, 2002, available
at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/849402/000095010902005028/d485bpos.htm (last
visited May 12, 2004).
48
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demanding that mutual funds disclose their boards’ voting in order to improve the information
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Thus, the understandings of independence vary between the Investment
Company Act, the SEC, and commentators because of the amount of information
each considers. The following statement, incorporated into the new cause of action
articulated in the preceding section, captures the notion of independence that each of
the three sources of meaning embrace: a director is independent if he acts, or at least
feels free to act, in a manner that benefits shareholders without regard for whether
such action adversely affects himself or the fund’s advisor. The manner in which the
Act seeks to accomplish this is by prohibiting specific relationships where the
conflicts of interest facing the independent director are so great as to impermissibly
interfere with the director’s ability to act adversely to the advisor. However,
commentators agree that even when directors meet the criteria of independence
under the Act and the SEC’s interpretation, their disincentives to act adversely to
advisors impermissibly interfere with their decision-making.53 One approach to
solving this problem might be to impose new standards of independence. This
approach could include whether directors had any relationship to advisors, not just a
material business or professional relationship, or the percentage of yearly income
that directors derive from any single family of funds. However, the establishment of
these safe harbors could easily be avoided by the use of clever compensation
arrangements or the careful selection of directors who fit the statutory definition of
“independent” yet remain beholden to advisors for their positions. Therefore, the
Act should embrace a general understanding of independence and expand the private
rights of action under the Act to include challenges to director independence.
B. Current Remedies are Insufficient
The Investment Company Act creates several rights of action, for both the
SEC and shareholders, against mutual fund directors. These include suits seeking
relief for unreasonable director or advisor compensation and breaches of fiduciary
duty by directors. In recent years, mutual fund shareholders have brought a number

available to shareholders, the Investment Company Institute, a lobbying group that typically
represents the interests of mutual fund advisors, mounted a massive lobbying campaign to prevent the
SEC from adopting the new requirements. See Kathleen Day, SEC Wants Funds to Disclose Votes; Rules
Proposed on Proxy Records, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 20, 2002, at E3; Kevin Burke, Proxy Bout Enters
Final Round, MUTUAL FUND MARKET NEWS (Mar. 10, 2003).
53

Id.
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of lawsuits against directors seeking relief for a lack of director independence.54
Courts have summarily dismissed most of these cases, interpreting the causes of
action available under the Act very narrowly in the process. This section describes
the statutorily created causes of action that are available under the Act and then
discusses courts’ treatments of these claims. Ultimately, this section concludes that
the current treatment of shareholder claims effectively precludes shareholders from
enforcing the meaningful independence that the preceding section describes.
The Investment Company Act provides several judicial remedies for
shareholders and the SEC who wish to ensure that directors fulfill their duties. First,
Section 36(a) of the Act authorizes the SEC to bring an action in federal court
against a fund director alleging that he or she “has engaged … or is about to engage
in any act or practice constituting a breach of fiduciary duty involving personal
misconduct in respect of any investment company.”55 Additionally, courts have read
an implied right of action into Section 36(a) that authorizes shareholders to bring
derivative actions alleging breaches of fiduciary duties for self-dealing against mutual
fund directors.56 Next, Section 36(b) of the Act authorizes shareholders to bring
actions against directors alleging breaches of fiduciary duty with respect to
compensatory arrangements between funds and their advisors.57 Section 36(b)
explicitly authorizes private citizens to bring suits against mutual fund directors.58
Congress enacted Section 36(b) in 1970 upon realizing that directors and advisors
throughout the mutual fund industry were not negotiating at arms-length when
determining advisory fees.59 Thus, the Act’s history includes precedent with which
to arm shareholders when alleging insufficiency of director independence.
See James N. Benedict, et al., Recent Developments in Litigation Under the Investment Company Act of 1940,
PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 238
(2000) (offering a comprehensive summary of litigation under the Investment Company Act).
54

5515

U.S.C. § 80a-35(a) (1997); ROBERT A. ROBERTSON, FUND GOVERNANCE: LEGAL DUTIES
INVESTMENT COMPANY DIRECTORS § 9.01 (2001).
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Id. at § 9.01[2]. This implied right of action is not addressed in detail in this article because courts
have generally held that it is limited to claims involving self-dealing by directors, advisors, or other
affiliated persons named in § 36(a). Benedict, et al., supra note 41, at 259-63. Though § 36(a) seems
more broad than § 36(b), in practice it presents an even more difficult standard under which to
enforce independence. Id.
56

57

15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1997).
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The courts’ treatment of shareholder actions, while consistent with the Act in
its current form, prevent shareholders from holding directors to standards of
meaningful independence.60 The leading case interpreting Section 36(b) allows suits
for breaches of “fiduciary duty” only in cases involving “excessive fees.”
Furthermore, the shareholder must prove that the fee is “so disproportionately large
that it bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered and could not have
been the product of arm’s-length bargaining.”61 The court, by limiting its focus to
the arm’s-length relationship between directors and advisors in negotiating advisory
fees, appears to have adopted such a high standard to ensure that Section 36(b)
actions do not devolve into suits regarding the performance of fund advisors.
However, some shareholders have attempted to use recent Section 36(b) actions to
enforce independence.
First, in Green v. Fund Asset Management, mutual fund shareholders brought a
Section 36(b) action alleging that fund advisors breached their fiduciary duties by
approving a fee structure under which the fund’s advisor had an incentive to fully
leverage the fund (an action that would ostensibly be contrary to the interests of
shareholders in many circumstances) in order to maximize its fees.62 The plaintiffs in
the case also alleged that the advisors failed to properly disclose the fee arrangement,
thereby further breaching their fiduciary duty to shareholders.63 The Third Circuit
reasoned that the advisors did not breach their fiduciary duties, because such fee
arrangements were common in the mutual fund industry, and the Act does not treat
the mere existence of an incentive to act against the interests of shareholders as a
breach of fiduciary duty.64 In arriving at this conclusion, the court mentioned that
the “fiduciary duty” contemplated in Section 36(b) is much more circumscribed than
traditional state law notions of “fiduciary duty.”65 Although this case did not involve
a suit against directors specifically, the shareholders attempted to seek judicial relief
60

“Meaningful independence” refers to the understanding offered by Section III of this article.

61

Gartenberg v. Merill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d 923, 928 (2d Cir. 1982).

62

Green v. Fund Asset Mgmt., 286 F.3d 682, 684 (3d Cir. 2002).
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from a fee arrangement that was not in their best interest. If shareholders66 found
this fee arrangement so undesirable that they were willing to sue the advisor, it seems
likely that they might sue the independent fund directors who did not fulfill the
fiduciary duty imposed by the Act when they negotiated the advisory fee contract.
Green is significant because the court upheld summary judgment for the advisor even
with the possibility of a factual dispute that the advisory and director did not
negotiate at arm’s-length.67
In a similar case, the Seventh Circuit upheld summary judgment against
mutual fund shareholders who alleged that an advisory fee arrangement based on a
percentage of the net assets of the fund created an impermissibly powerful incentive
for the advisor to breach his fiduciary duties to shareholders.68 In Green v. Nuveen
Advisory Corp., the court offered further clarification that was absent in the Third
Circuit case. The Nuveen court noted the distinction between a plaintiff alleging that
an impermissible temptation existed and one in which an advisor had actually acted
on this incentive.69 The former situation, the court held, could not constitute a
breach of fiduciary duty, while the latter could.70 Thus, the Nuveen case provides
another example of a court refusing to find a potential breach of fiduciary duty
where plaintiffs allege that the arm’s-length relationship between fund directors and
advisors broke down.
The purpose of discussing the Green and Nuveen cases is not to criticize the
courts’ reasoning, but rather to illustrate the limitations of the private right of action
by shareholders against directors created by Section 36(b). The courts essentially
limit these actions to instances involving excessive fees, neglecting other instances
where director independence appears to have failed.
In an inspired attempt to enforce mutual fund shareholders’ rights, a
shareholder filed suit against the Investment Company Institute (“ICI”), the primary

66 Actually, it seems more likely that a handful of activist shareholders and a plaintiff’s attorney
probably thought that, perhaps, the legal claim involved in this case was worth pursuing.
67

Green v. Fund Asset Mgmt., 286 F.3d at 683.
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Green v. Nuveen Advisory Corp., 295 F.3d 738, 739-40 (7th Cir. 2002).
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trade group and a powerful lobbying force for the mutual fund industry.71 The
plaintiff-shareholder alleged that the membership dues collected by ICI from its
members, one of which was a mutual fund in which she was a shareholder, made the
ICI an “affiliated person” accountable to shareholders for breaches of fiduciary
duties under Section 36(b).72 Furthermore, the plaintiff argued, the ICI engaged in
activities that served the interests of fund advisors to the detriment of shareholders’
interests.73 The court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim on the grounds that membership
dues did not make the ICI an “affiliated person.”74 Additionally, the court examined
the legislative history of the Act and concluded that Section 36(b) was only meant to
apply to actions against directors and advisors for excessive advisory fees, despite the
fact that its language purports to cover any breach of a fiduciary duty.75 The court
reached this conclusion even though ICI probably acted in the interests of mutual
fund advisors to the detriment of its members’ shareholders.76 Thus, judicial
interpretation of the Act prevented another check on the activities of mutual fund
advisors when it appeared that directors failed to adequately police their activities.
The final case representing the current state of shareholder litigation under
the Act is Migdal v. Rowe-Price Fleming International, Inc.77 In Migdal, shareholders sued a
mutual fund advisor under Section 36(b) alleging that the advisor’s fees were
excessive and bolstered their argument by complaining that the directors of the fund
were not “independent” because the directors served on numerous boards within
one fund family.78 The Fourth Circuit upheld the district court’s dismissal of this

Rohrbaugh v. Inv. Co. Inst., No. 00-1237, July 2, 2002, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13401, *2-3
(D.D.C. 2002).
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Palmiter, supra note 46.

77 Migdal v. Rowe-Price Fleming Int’l, Inc., 248 F.3d 321 (4th Cir. 2001). Incidentally, one of the
plaintiffs in this case was Linda Rohrbaugh of the Rohrbaugh case; see supra note 71.
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case reasoning that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim.79 First, the court explained
that the plaintiffs had not provided a meaningful explanation of why the fees the
advisors had secured from the fund were “excessive,” even though the plaintiffs
asserted that several similar funds offered lower rates.80 Second, the court explained
that director independence, as it relates to sitting on numerous boards, is irrelevant
for the purposes of a Section 36(b) excessive fee analysis.81 Nevertheless, the court
discussed the possibility that the fee arrangement between the fund and the
defendant was not the result of arm’s-length bargaining.82 The court further stated
that since the plaintiffs had not proven, or even alleged facts that would, if true,
prove, that the advisor somehow controlled the independent directors, the issue of
independence did not matter in the case at hand.83 Finally, the court provided
illuminating commentary on its narrow interpretation of Section 36(b): “The
Investment Company Act balances the tension between protecting mutual fund
investors from overly generous charges by investment advisers, and shielding fund
management from an outbreak of harassing lawsuits. Any change in this balance will
have to come from Congress.”84
These representative cases indicate that shareholders are essentially powerless
to combat the lack of director independence in their mutual funds, despite the fact
that Congress enacted a private cause of action designed to ensure that arm’s-length
bargaining occurs between mutual fund directors and advisors.85 Each discussed
case involved a situation where plaintiffs alleged that directors failed to act
independently, and in every case, plaintiffs were left without recourse.
Section III(A) of this article posits that commentators, the SEC, and the
Investment Company Act appear to embrace the idea that true “independence”
allows a director to feel free to act in a manner that benefits shareholders without
regard for whether such action adversely affects a fund’s advisor. The situations that
79
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these cases present, including advisory fees based on a percentage of a fund’s net
assets, payments to the ICI, and directors who sit on numerous boards, all
demonstrate some indication that the directors involved do not meet this notion of
“independence.”
Mutual fund shareholders do not appear to have the power to enforce
director independence in state courts. Additionally, at least one federal court has
concluded that Congress intended the Section 36(b) right of action to pre-empt state
actions.86 The court noted that existing remedies were inadequate and the Act’s
actions differed from state actions in scope, parties, and relief, generating
impermissible conflicts between the Act and state law. On the other hand, an Illinois
appellate court held that a district court improperly dismissed a common law breach
of fiduciary duty claim that mutual fund shareholders brought against the directors
and advisors of a mutual fund.87 However, there appears to be no further litigation
on this issue particularly when the plaintiffs’ claims for self-dealing by insiders of
mutual fund directors could have survived summary judgment.
One Delaware court declared that “non-affiliated directors ha[ve] the same
responsibility as that of the ordinary directors of a Delaware corporation. Their
non-affiliated status is a creation of the Investment Company Act, but it does not
lessen their obligations.”88 However, this forty-year-old decision addressed the
“grossly negligent” behavior of certain mutual fund directors, and it provides little
guidance regarding a shareholder’s current prospects for seeking judicial redress for
lack of director independence, particularly considering that ordinary directors are
substantially insulated by the Business Judgment Rule in Delaware.89 Finally, another
Delaware case from the 1960’s involved a shareholder who directly argued that
mutual fund directors acted in a manner that no independent director would
rationally act and, therefore, violated the Act rather than state corporate law.90 The
Coran court held that since the “non-independent” action alleged by the plaintiff did
86 Green v. Fund Asset Mgmt., L.P., 53 F. Supp. 2d 723 (D.N.J. 1999) (overruled on other grounds by 245
F.3d 214 (3rd Cir. 2001)).
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not, itself, violate the Act, the plaintiff failed to state a claim.91 Because this case only
involved the Act and not state corporate law, it is presumed that state remedy was
available. Thus, there appears to be no state law alternative to Section 36(b) for
shareholders who wish to enforce director independence in state courts.
All told, the current private enforcement mechanism existing under the Act
does not afford mutual fund shareholders the opportunity to hold their directors to
meaningful standards of independence, despite the fact that Congress sought to
ensure an arm’s-length relationship between directors and advisors under
Section 36(b).
C. Economic Forces Will Not Improve Independence on Their Own
If a lack of director independence is such a rampant problem throughout the
mutual fund industry, then it follows that shareholders would “vote with their feet,”
or sell their shares in funds in which they perceive an impermissible lack of
independence. We could draw two conclusions from the phenomenon that
shareholders do not seem particularly bothered by this syndrome of coziness
between directors and advisors: (1) they are not aware that it exists, or
(2) shareholders simply do not care about director independence. If the former is
true, then perhaps we need stronger disclosure requirements or a more robust notion
of what constitutes an “affiliated person” under the Act, rather than a new cause of
action. If the latter is true, and independence has no bearing on anything that is
important to consumers, then it seems wasteful for Congress to intercede with a
novel cause of action. This position seems persuasive, but it relies on the
assumption that if there is a defect in fund governance, then the market will correct
it as mutual fund shareholders sell or refuse to purchase shares of those funds with
directors perceived as lacking independence. There are at least two reasons to reject
this assumption.
First, the existence of the Act itself is a monumental acknowledgement that
we cannot rely on market forces to weed out impermissible practices in the
management of investment companies. Second, commentators appear to agree that
an impermissible lack of director independence pervades the mutual fund industry,
despite the fact that shareholders are, and have for a long time been, free to vote
with their feet. Assuming that commentators’ observations are a reasonable proxy
for the way that mutual fund shareholders would vote if they acted in an
economically rational way, it appears that shareholders’ retention due to a perceived
91
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lack of director independence does not reflect a conscious statement that
shareholders do not care about director independence. 92 Rather, it seems more likely
that shareholders are not aware of the mutual fund independence conflict. Although
there is no empirical support for this proposition, the lack of activist institutional
investor shareholders in the mutual fund context probably accounts for this
phenomenon.
Additionally, ordinary shareholders will not frequently enforce their rights
under the new cause of action. Activist shareholders and enterprising plaintiffs’
attorneys will more likely present litigation that should precipitate increased
independence and, subsequently, improved governance. Additionally, this new cause
of action should precipitate some change in fund governance; hopefully the threat of
litigation will remain a threat and not become a flurry of litigation. However, at this
point it is necessary to contemplate the reality of the policy choice of creating a new
cause of action.
One criticism of this article’s approach is that it would function to line the
pockets of class-action plaintiffs’ lawyers who specialize in securities. Critics may
argue that the risk of a blizzard of frivolous lawsuits will cripple otherwise profitable
investment companies outweighs any potential benefits of a new cause of action.
Furthermore, the threat of litigation could work more to extort settlement money
from directors than to improve directorial practices. Given the well-documented
eagerness of plaintiffs’ lawyers in the field of securities, these risks are certainly real.93
However, these weaknesses merely identify an inherent drawback to the regulatory
choice of private enforcement.94

92 See Palmiter supra note 46, at 1426-27 (setting out mutual fund ownership statistics demonstrating
that an enormous number of individuals in the United States own shares in mutual funds). Since so
many people own stakes in mutual funds and a lack of director independence is apparently rampant in
the industry, it is reasonably safe to conclude that shareholders either are not aware of the problem or
do not care about it.
93 The substantial effect that plaintiffs’ lawyers can have on the overall market is well-documented.
See e.g., Peter Elkind, Score One for the Snake, FORTUNE, Mar. 5, 2001, at 44.

See SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, REGULATORY LAW AND POLICY 392–95 (2003)
(describing the relative positive and negative aspects of a litigation-based regulation versus other types
of regulation).
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The cost of litigation is the greatest negative result of private enforcement,
whereas the benefits of private enforcement include superior ex post fact-finding,
direct compensation of injured parties, and a precise attribution of liability to
particular parties.95 Traditional regulation, on the other hand, allows an agency to
promulgate rules and enforce them. This method provides more predictability via ex
ante rulemaking and an opportunity to appoint true experts to promulgate
regulations, as opposed to forcing judges to parse similar issues in fields where they
might not have expertise. Individuals that agencies employ, on the other hand, often
have a greater incentive to ensure the existence and longevity of the agency. A
regulator does not want to carry out his mission too well, or the need for the agency
might become obsolete.96 For example, some critics have expressed the view that
recent SEC regulations governing the mutual fund industry are largely ineffective and
blame the cozy relationship that apparently developed between the government and
the private sector.97
Thus, it is important to recognize that, in a sense, one must “pick her
poison” when selecting a method of regulation. In other words, any approach that
one chooses necessarily involves certain inherent weaknesses, and the risk of costly
litigation is certainly a weakness from which the regulatory approach of private
enforcement suffers.
Congress should have already decided to take the regulatory approach of
private enforcement in the area of investment company director relationships with
shareholders. Further, a modest extension of that choice would improve the extent
to which the choice effectuates Congress’ goals. Five or ten years from now, we
might look back on the recent reaction to perceived abuses in the investment
company industry, particularly the SEC’s recent regulations and the historic lawsuit
that state attorneys general are currently attempting against some of the nation’s
largest mutual fund companies, and conclude that these measures adequately
“cleaned up” the industry. However, by modifying the Act to arm shareholders with
a robust cause of action, Congress will better address the condition that seems most
to blame for mutual fund company abuses, directors’ coziness with advisors,
regardless of the extent to which regulators and executive officials’ priorities may
shift over time.
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The important role that private enforcement activities play in the governance
of traditional corporations has been well-documented98 and, despite the distaste
many people undoubtedly harbor for litigation and the plaintiffs’ bar, private
enforcement has a useful role to play in the mutual fund context. This article merely
argues that, if we already have private enforcement for mutual fund shareholders, let
us make it optimal.
D. Why Expand the Current Cause of Action Beyond Cases Involving Excessive Fees? Isn’t the
Negotiation of Advisory Fees the Only Director Activity in Which Independence Really Matters?
Negotiating the advisor’s fee is perhaps the most important duty of the
mutual fund director.99 As the preceding discussion of case law explains, the Act
already creates a private right of action for shareholders to combat “excessive
fees.”100 Therefore, it seems that an additional cause of action would address a
non-existent problem. However, there are two reasons to reject this notion. First,
despite the existence of this well-established cause of action, commentators still
suggest that an impermissible lack of independence exists.101 Though this problem
may involve the issue of advisory fees in the vast majority of cases, some new or
additional enforcement appears necessary to achieve a desirable level of
independence. Second, some circumstances present an independence problem that
does not involve advisory fees. The Rohrbaugh case, involving the membership fees
that a fund paid to the ICI, discussed such an instance.102
Likewise, as discussed in Part II, the decision to remove or not to remove the
fund’s advisor presents, the paradigmatic instance in which director independence is
vital even though it does not involve advisory fees. For example, in the notorious
98 See Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, Shareholder Litigation: Reexamining the Balance Between
Litigation
Agency
Costs
and
Management
Agency
Costs,
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=336162 (last visited May 12, 2004).

Symposium Panel, supra note 4, at 433 (stating that “[t]he principal duty [of the mutual fund
independent director] is hiring and, theoretically, firing fund managers and other service providers).
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Navellier case, independent directors voted to remove a mutual fund’s advisor.103 An
affiliated director and advisor, Navellier, threatened to abandon the fund unless the
independent directors reinstated the advisor and resigned.104 After the independent
directors submitted to Navellier’s demands, Navellier sued for breach of fiduciary
duty under the Act. The case went to trial, though the independent directors
ultimately prevailed.105 The Navellier case presents an especially extreme example of
the importance of the decision to remove the advisor and its implications for
independence. Therefore, the counter-argument that the only important director
independence issues involve excessive fees is not a persuasive reason to abandon an
“independence-specific” cause of action because other equally important decisions
the board must make, especially whether to remove an advisor, implicate
independence as well.
IV. Conclusion
Those who observe the mutual fund industry seem to agree that director
independence does not exist.106 The current statutory regime neither captures a
meaningful notion of independence nor allows shareholders to pursue the private
enforcement of breakdowns in the arm’s-length relationship that is supposed to exist
between directors and advisors. To remedy this problem, Congress should
promulgate a private right of action that specifically allows shareholders to enforce
independence. The value of this solution is that it would allow the enforcement of a
meaningful notion of independence without sacrificing the benefits that the current
board structures and director selection processes seem to present.107 The weakness
of this new cause of action is that its broadness has the potential to precipitate a
landslide of lawsuits that lack merit, but capitalize on the ambiguities inherent in a
broadly articulated cause of action. This would force judges to make ex post
evaluations of business decision-making. Hence, this article adopts the Delaware
Corporate law “intermediate” standard of review as a useful guide for balancing this
tension. A new cause of action that allows shareholders to enforce a meaningful
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107 The benefits are the economies of scale and low expense that the “house director” board structure
presents. Ostensibly, the more robust the search for qualified independent directors, the greater
expense this creates for shareholders.
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notion of director independence constitutes one useful approach to correcting a
rampant problem in the mutual fund industry.

